Tag Archive | WWIII

U.S. Lawmakers Introduce Legislation to Unleash Nuclear Arms Race in Europe*

U.S. Lawmakers Introduce Legislation to Unleash Nuclear Arms Race in Europe*

By Andrei Akulov

The INF Treaty was a major breakthrough to halt and reverse the Cold War-era nuclear arms race in Europe. There are growing signs that the treaty is in jeopardy. A possible U.S. unilateral withdrawal and failure to resolve the compliance dispute could impede efforts to save the arms control regime from being eroded.

On February 16, Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), along with Senators Ron Johnson (R-Wisconsin) and Marco Rubio (R-Florida) introduced the Intermediate-Range Forces Treaty (INF) Preservation Act, legislation that would allow the United States to develop new intermediate-range missiles. Congressmen Ted Poe (R-Texas) and Mike Rogers (R-Alabama) introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives.

The accusations of Russia violating the INF Treaty not backed up by any evidence were used as a pretext for introducing the measure. For instance, the New York Times has recently published report saying that Russia «has secretly deployed» a new nuclear-capable intermediate-range cruise missile, the SSC-8, in apparent violation of the 1987 treaty.

«This legislation will give President Trump the tools he needs to show our friends and adversaries alike that ‘peace through strength’ is back», said Mike Rogers.

The INF Treaty is a key agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which put a seal on the Cold War era. It eliminated all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges, defined as between 500-5,500 kilometers (3000-3400 miles).

If the bill becomes a law, it won’t add to U.S. or NATO security. America has real interest in preserving the treaty in force. It has sound reasons for doing so. One of them is that U.S. – NATO allies greatly value the INF and want it to remain effective. A U.S. withdrawal would raise concern on their part.

With no hard evidence of non-compliance produced, the U.S. will be held responsible by international community for ending the treaty. If Washington possessed facts to substantiate the claim that Moscow is in violation of the treaty, it would have been provided them a long time ago.

The bill says the U.S. is to ‘develop» new systems. But even if a decision were taken to return obsolete Pershing-2s and long-range Tomahawks, it would take time and effort. On its part, Russia can easily increase the range of existing Iskander missiles.

Developing U.S. new systems would impose a new burden on an already stretched defense budget. Funding an new expensive program would make draw funds from other accounts, such as new conventional weapons, the upgrade of strategic nuclear forces, the ballistic missile defense (BMD), you name it. Today, the U.S. national debt is about $20 trillion and the clock is ticking.

Even if the provision of the bill is carried out and a new intermediate range system is in place, the U.S. will face a tall order in finding an ally willing to host it and become a target for a pre-emptive strike by Russian armed forces. Such deployments would be viewed as extremely provocative to Moscow.

Even in the 1980s it was a close thing. Those days the plans to deploy INF forces met fierce domestic political and public opposition. A controversial decision would tear NATO apart at the time the US and its European allies don’t see eye to eye on many issues.

The same applies to deployment plans in the Pacific. Japan would worry about deteriorating the relationship with Russia and China. South Korea would fear such a deployment would might disrupt its improving relations with China.

The times have changed. Today, Russia possesses cutting edge S-400 aid defense systems capable of countering not only ballistic but also cruise missiles with an operational range of 3,000−3,500 km (1,864-2,174 mi).

The Russian military is gearing up to test the first prototypes of its next-generation S-500 Prometey air and missile defense system. The weapon has no analogues in the world. S-500 is the fifth generation system capable of destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles and spacecraft, hypersonic cruise missiles and airplanes at speeds of higher than Mach 5. Its response time is only 3-4 seconds, just think about it! It can detect and simultaneously attack up to ten ballistic missile warheads out at 600 km flying at speeds of twenty-three thousand feet per second. The system can engage targets at altitudes of about 125 miles, including incoming ballistic missiles in space at ranges as great as 400 miles. Evidently, Russia has means to counter the threat. It puts into doubt the effectiveness of any future intermediate range weapon the US would develop in accordance with legislation in question.

The end of INF treaty would provoke other states into an arms race the U.S. cannot control.

The bill is introduced at the time the world is facing the most serious and comprehensive crisis in the fifty-year history of nuclear arms control. Since pulling out from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the US has been taking one step after another to undermine the arms control regime that has served as a pillar of international security for dozens of years. Now the US Congress is on the brink of unleashing an arms race with dire consequences for America itself.

Does it all make sense? Russia has recently announced its goal to shift from nuclear to conventional deterrence to make the world safer.

The recent initiative Germany, supported by leading the leading European partners, provides a new chance to address the problems of European security. With so many controversial issues on the agenda, Helsinki-2 would be the right way to launch discussions on creating a security regime from Lisbon to Vladivostok – something Moscow proposed a few years ago.

There are opportunities to seize and turn the tide as arms control is unraveling. Instead, a group of U.S. lawmakers has introduced a legislation to quash all hopes for a better world. Never before the arms control regime had been threatened so much. Voting for the bill means shooting yourself in the foot. The U.S. will undermine its own security and create huge problems to overcome. Hopefully, there will be enough sober-minded members of Congress to prevent the measure from becoming a law.


Related Topics:

Iran Sticks to Nuclear Deal in Spite of Threats from Warmongers*

E.U. to Take Control of British Nuclear Deterrent*

Files linking Britain to Israel’s nuclear weapons go missing from National Archives*

The Russia-Turkey Agreement that is Causing the CIA to Launch Nuclear Weapons against Turkey*

FBI Raids European International Adoption Agency*

Sixteen European States Want Arms Control Agreement with Russia*

Idlib Raid Hits CIA/Saudi Backed Rebels as “President Banner” Tries to Bury Yemen Blunder*

Idlib Raid Hits CIA/Saudi Backed Rebels as “President Banner” Tries to Bury Yemen Blunder*

An al Qaeda “number two” gets killed every ten days, making it one of the worst jobs in the world


Eleven militants with links to Al-Qaeda, including a senior operative, were killed in two U.S. sorties in Syria’s Idlib province, the Pentagon has said. It comes after the opposition on the ground blamed mass loss of civilian life on recent airstrikes in the area.

U.S. warplanes hit “an al-Qaida meeting place” on February 3, killing “10 terrorists” who were inside the building at the time, Pentagon spokesman, Capt. Jeff Davis said in a statement released Wednesday.

US B-52 bombed Idlib, Syria, killing over 20 civilians – Russian MoD

Another raid on February 4 targeted a high-profile Al-Qaeda operative Abu Hani al-Masri, believed to be behind multiple terror attacks, including a foiled plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Albania in 1998. Al-Masri is said to have belonged to a narrow circle of Al-Qaeda’s top commanders and have had ties to Osama bin Laden as well as the terrorist group’s current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

As one of Al-Qaeda senior leaders, al-Masri had a lengthy record of terrorism-related crimes, going back to the 80s. He “oversaw the creation and operation of many Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in the 1980s and ’90s, where he recruited, indoctrinated and equipped thousands of terrorists,” the statement reads.

Trump says: “I killed bin Laden’s grandma”

Trump says: “I killed bin Laden’s grandma”

Trump says: “I killed bin Laden’s grandma”

Pentagon says al-Masri has become the fourth Al-Qaeda leader it killed since the start of the year.

Earlier Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon reported that the raids on February 3 and February 4 were “two precision strikes” with one of them deliberately targeting al-Masri.

“We are assessing the results of those strikes and will announce definitive results as soon as practicable,” he said in a statement Tuesday.

Moscow dismisses reports of Russian airstrikes on Idlib

Meanwhile, opposition activists in the rebel-held Idlib province have been claiming the ongoing bombing campaign in the area is targeting innocent civilians. Reports attributed to opposition sources on the ground say that up to 30 people, mostly women, fell victim to the Tuesday airstrike which targeted the city of Idlib.

With no information on exactly who carried out the strike immediately available, the Russian Defense Ministry was quick to dismiss reports of its alleged role in the bloodshed, calling it an example of “fake news.” The ministry’s spokesman, Major General Igor Konashenkov, said that Russian warplanes “have not conducted a single airstrike in the city of Idlib yesterday, or last week, or even since the beginning of 2017.”

On February 1, the headquarters of the Syrian Red Crescent in the province were badly damaged in the airstrike labeled by the President of the Turkish Red Crescent Kerem Kinik a “clear war crime” perpetrated by the U.S.-led coalition in violation of the international law.

Following the strike, at least four of the Red Crescent staff members suffered injuries and one was in critical condition.

A Pentagon spokesman reported late January that over 150 Al-Qaeda affiliated militants have been killed in U.S. airstrikes since the beginning of 2017. In another “precision airstrike” targeting an Al-Qaeda training camp in Idlib, over 100 “terrorist fighters” were killed.


Related Topics:

Water Supply Cut off in Raqqa City due U.S.-led Coalition Airstrikes*

Turkey Continues Repeated Violations against the Sanctity and Unity of Syria’s Sovereignty*

Jewish Members of Trump Administration Might Explain a Few Things*

Obama Killed a 16-Year-Old American in Yemen. 8-Year-Old Sister Killed in Raid Ordered by Trump *

Who’s Paying Amnesty Int’l to Lie about Syria?*

A Flemish Priest in Syria, “Putin and Assad saved my life”*

Russia Hammers ISIS in Deir Ez-zor, Airlifts Syrian Troops There*

Soros Partners with MasterCard to Profiteer from his Engineered Mass Migration*

Syrian Army Kills Scores of ISIS and al-Nusra Terrorists in Deir Ez-Zor and Homs*

U.S. to Take Control of British Nuclear Deterrent*

S. Voter Fraud Investigation Order Quietly Trashed*

E.U. to Take Control of British Nuclear Deterrent*

E.U. to Take Control of British Nuclear Deterrent*

By David Ellis

A briefing by Strategic Defence Initiatives on the E.U.’s subversion of the British military.

Everything must now be put on the table — from higher [E.U.] military spending to a British-French nuclear defense shield for the continent. – Max Hofmann of Deutsche Welle on 20 January 2017

Comment: The last time I looked the continent is Asia…..

This short briefing sheet (available as a downloadable pdf) has been produced to highlight some of the key areas and perceived risks of the integration of the U.K. into a single integrated E.U. defence structure. The content has been compiled by those with military experience, including submarine operations — this experience is considered important in relation to comments made not only in relation to the Royal Navy, but particularly the nuclear deterrent.

In focusing in greater detail on some significant Royal Navy issues regarding size of the fleet, specific units and the nuclear deterrent, the joint risks of E.U. integration to both the Army and Royal Air Force are by no means belittled. On the contrary, there is much more to be said on behalf of these two services than can be covered in this summary paper.


The recent British referendum has made no difference to the speed and tenacity with which the Conservative Government under Prime Minister Theresa May and Secretary of State for Defence Sir Michael Fallon (a strong E.U. advocate and former E.U. Movement supporter) are continuing the path to E.U. military union. There has been no change in the advancing integration of U.K. military forces into the E.U. structure — the subject is simply not discussed in political, public and media forums, which is testimony to the usual E.U. policy of implementation by stealth where possible.

Perhaps most dangerous here is the rapid integration of the E.U. commercial military procurement and supply chain, operating under an E.U. treasury already being declared and implemented. Once locked together under E.U. procurement rules, and with ‘joint interoperability’ doctrine driving pan-E.U. military needs, Britain will be further stripped of its ability to design, build and supply our own weapons systems and munitions. This will further strengthen the E.U. political tactic of creating ‘interdependence’ between E.U. member states as a tool for removing sovereign identity and the ability to act as an independent nation state.

Understanding E.U. Military Integration Policy

The E.U. has consistently and publicly stated that the goal of the E.U. is to form a single integrated supranational state, with law, internal security, defence and foreign policy controlled from Brussels. The E.U. Organisation for External Action (Foreign Policy vehicle of the E.U.) recently quoted Frederica Mogherini’s policy as follows:

Security is a priority for the E.U. … We have hard and soft power. We have done more on defence in the last seven months than in decades. Building on the ideas in her Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy, Mogherini has illustrated the European Union’s three-pronged set of measures to strengthen the EU’s security and defence capability … In a reshaping world the only way for the Europeans to be global players is through the E.U.

The implication is clear — E.U. security and defence capability is to be strengthened as a centralised Brussels-led objective. This is not simply an invitation for member states to contribute more to E.U. security and defence at will. Many further official E.U. policy quotes emphasise the integrated E.U. defence objective.

Forming an E.U. military required a number of significant hurdles to be overcome. These included:

  1. integration of E.U. member states’ armed forces with a wide spread of operational performance, equipment types and levels, experience and historic theatres of operation.
  2. imbalance between Britain as a top-tier NATO partner and many other E.U. nation states.
  3. significant strategic imbalance between the maritime strength of the Royal Navy and that of other E.U. navies, whilst acknowledging the size and capability of French maritime forces.
  4. the strong U.S.-U.K. ‘special relationship’, at both military and military intelligence levels, which produces a tiered military structure favouring the U.S. and U.K. over E.U. member states other than the U.K.
  5. negating the perceived threat to NATO strength and operations by the creation of an integrated E.U. military.
  6. achieving a unified defence procurement and build environment across the E.U. member states, particularly one which could replace and equal the power and impact of U.S.-procured weapons and equipment entering the E.U. supply chain, especially via the U.K. on the back of its special U.S. relationship.
  7. integrating the U.K. and French strategic nuclear deterrents to bring them under centralised E.U. political control.
  8. common agreement on defence levels, budgetary contribution and policy amongst E.U. member states — this includes a single E.U. treasury.
  9. establishment of an E.U. command, control and communications structure.

E.U. policy has always been to secure its political objects step by step, salami slicing, using the so- called ‘ratchet mechanism’ and the doctrine of never relinquishing any aspect of the acquis communautaire to ensure that member states cannot easily retract from progress made towards a political goal. This can also be described as a soft power approach, where the change and political agenda is drifted in under distracting labels and language.

In considering the drive to E.U. military union, we must recognise that alongside the call for military union arising externally to the U.K., i.e. by the E.U. itself, this key E.U. political has been driven in parallel from within the U.K. by our own pro-E.U. governments, be they Labour, Conservative or Conservative- Liberal Democrat coalition. (N.B.: An important comment is made on Brexit at the end of this briefing.)

Since the U.K.’s internal pro-E.U. military agenda has been largely driven by stealth, or at least by obfuscation of the real political agenda — a smoke-screen of half-truths, spin and outright denial of the ultimate Westminster goal of a fully integrated E.U. military — we must look to the broader evidence for this political goal.

A simple Internet search on the subject of an E.U. army reveals entry after entry for mainstream media articles reporting the plan for this key step towards an E.U. military. These include: Juncker calls for E.U. army, Juncker proposes E.U. military HQ, European Parliament backs plans to create a defence union, Europe forges ahead with plans for an E.U. army — the overall press and media coverage is too numerous to list, and has spanned many years. The plan for an E.U. army has thus been ‘hidden in plain sight’ whilst largely publicly denied by the U.K. government. See particularly the European Commission’s European Defence Action Plan of 30 November 2016, COM(2016) 950 final.

Behind the scenes, the Westminster political strategy towards the E.U. military has proceeded apace with a number of key defence-related policies which now, seen together, and with the advantage of hindsight, give a strong pointer to the undeclared pro-E.U. military line.

E.U.-driven policy for the formation of an Integrated E.U. military

At this point, we return to the potential obstacles to E.U. military union, and add the measures taken by the E.U. and its agents in Westminster to overcome the difficulties:

  1. integration of E.U. member states’ armed forces with a wide spread of operational performance, equipment types and levels, experience and historic theatres of operation.

Action taken: Drive a programme of E.U. exercises and operational co-operation. This objective has accelerated in recent years with, for example, Operation ATALANTA (the joint E.U. maritime anti- piracy force — significantly commanded by the Commandant General Royal Marines), large-scale British and French Army exercises on Salisbury Plain together with the signing of an MOU for those operations and future Franco-British operations, and large scale joint paratroop training. French C3 forces have been integrated into a new joint French military operations centre at the former St Mawgan military airfield in Cornwall. Lately, the E.U. has been particularly active in driving for E.U. forces to operate in Eastern Europe, leading to increasing public confusion as to whether these were NATO or E.U. military exercises.

In recent months, the E.U. has also achieved integration of German and Dutch army units, and several E.U. member states have swapped command posts, a policy which has allowed a senior French officer to command British troops.

  1. imbalance between Britain as a top-tier NATO partner and many other EU nation states.

Action taken: Repeated and substantial cuts to British army capability in men and equipment has now reduced the army to some 82,000 men, and equipment levels which have been openly described as insufficient to fight a major military campaign in Europe, and a complete inability to operate on more than one front. The power and influence of the German army has thus been increased to help restore its position as the traditional European military power, and this effect is being enhanced by integration of Dutch and French units under German command and control.

  1. significant strategic imbalance between the maritime strength of the Royal Navy and that of other E.U. navies, whilst acknowledging the size and capability French maritime forces.

Action taken: Repeated cuts to the size of the Royal Navy by scrapping frigates, destroyers, submarines and serviceable aircraft carriers and operational Maritime Patrol Aircraft so as to bring the RN to greater parity with the French, and particularly to weaken traditional RN operations of scale with the US. Cuts have been exacerbated by delays and increasing chaos in new class orders. It should be noted that such was the rush to destroy the Nimrod MPA fleet that Britain’s nuclear deterrent has been exposed to a level described by many senior military officers as dangerous.

At the same time, evidence of unprecedented Anglo-French maritime co-operation has been revealed by the collision between the French nuclear deterrent submarine Le Triomphant and HMS Vanguard — a collision never explained to the British public, but which placed the U.K. deterrent at grave risk and which can only have occurred due to the deliberate tasking of both units in close geographic proximity. The clear inference is a further layer of undeclared joint Franco-British military co-operation. It is highly significant that the new U.K. aircraft carriers have been jointly designed with the French, and such has been the damage to continuity in British aircraft carrier operations that there are now grave concerns as to the retraining and work-up time required for flight deck and aviation specialists to be reinstated with historic levels of skills and experience. Royal Navy personnel have had to be sent to the French carrier to be trained, and it should be noted that in 2008 Westminster dropped plans for the Queen Elizabeth class to be joint British-French manned. Significantly, a recent article by the Daily Mail on the new carriers ended with the statement:

“As a result the U.S. are expected to make use of the carrier with their aircraft — as may other [E.U.] countries such as Italy who eventually buy the jets.”

  1. the strong U.S.-U.K. ‘special relationship’, at both military and military intelligence levels, which produces a tiered military structure favouring the U.S. and U.K. over E.U. member states other than the U.K.

Action taken: U.S.-U.K. military relations have been successfully undermined by the substantial cuts in U.K. military force levels (driven by pro-E.U.. political policy in the U.K.) which have significantly reduced the ability of the U.K. to support the U.S. in large-scale military operations, as was the case in the Gulf. British anti-submarine capability, highly valued and praised by the U.S., has also been greatly weakened by U.K. defence cuts, particularly in submarines, frigates, the decommissioning of our three anti-submarine-focused aircraft carriers and the loss of the Nimrod fleet. Increasing U.K. involvement with integrated E.U. military operations, including the installation of a London-based E.U. military HQ and command-and-control centre at Northwood, sends confusing messages to the U.S. regarding Britain’s commitment to the U.S. and NATO, and has raised questions as to the security of U.S.-U.K. operations and the protection of high-level intelligence.

  1. negating the perceived threat to NATO strength and operations by the creation of an integrated E.U. military.

Action taken: This concern has been addressed in the first instance by the EU simply and repeatedly denying the formation even of an ‘E.U. army’ — which term is itself a crafted understatement of the goal of full E.U. military integration. This E.U. political lie has then been reinforced by the E.U.’s continual failure to recognise, or more accurately to admit, that an E.U. military must of necessity undermine NATO. To add insult to injury, the E.U. has simply turned a blind eye to the fact that any E.U. military must inevitably be substantially weaker than a U.S.-led NATO. Overall, the E.U. has failed to carry the E.U.-versus-NATO argument which has been re-ignited following the election of President Trump.

  1. achieving a unified defence procurement and build environment across the E.U. member states, particularly one which could replace and equal the power and impact of U.S.-procured weapons and equipment entering the E.U. supply chain, especially via the U.K. on the back of its special U.S. relationship.

Action taken: The E.U. strategy here has been simple and visible. Pan-European projects were created to introduce both the public and military to the idea of joint European development and production. The development of Concorde was an early lead here, and was followed by both other civilian and military aviation projects such as Tornado and Airbus. We might also consider the scrapping of the U.K.’s Sea Eagle missile for the French Exocet — the very missile which was used to sink British ships in the Falklands. The joint U.K.-French design and build of the Queen Elizabeth- class carriers has now taken the building of major warships out of British national control, has shared our shipbuilding and military specifications with the French, and has helped undermine the maintenance of U.K.-based shipbuilding and the associated expertise.

  1. integrating the U.K. and French strategic nuclear deterrents to bring them under centralised E.U. political control.

Action taken: Operating under the E.U.’s established political salami slicing and smokescreen strategy, the clue to the path towards centralised E.U. control of the strategic nuclear deterrent comes from an inspection of the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties signed by Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy after no tangible Westminster debate and no full and open consultation with the higher levels of the U.K. military. Published objectives included:

  • Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty: The purpose of this is to develop co-operation between British and French Armed Forces, the sharing and pooling of materials and equipment including through mutual interdependence [emphasis not original], the building of joint facilities, mutual access to each other’s defence markets, and industrial and technological co-operation.
  • Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship: Collaboration on the technology associated with nuclear stockpile stewardship in support of both countries’ independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, including a new joint facility at Valduc in France that will model performance of nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety – this will be supported by a joint Technology Development Centre at Aldermaston in the U.K.
  • Operational Matters: It was also decided to sign a Letter of Intent, creating a new framework for exchanges between U.K. and French Armed Forces on operational matters.
  • Industry and Armaments: It was decided to direct the U.K.-France High Level Working Group to strengthen its work on industrial and armament cooperation.

The key statement is Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship. Why in 2010 did the U.K. suddenly need to collaborate with the French in order to be able to develop and operate the technology associated with (in practice, this revolves around the fissile material expertise in) ‘nuclear stockpile stewardship?’ Had the U.K. become incompetent or inept in this field after years of independent operation of a maritime nuclear deterrent? The answer to this statement can only be no, especially when we consider that the focus of British ability in this strategic area had largely swung to U.K.-U.S. shared expertise, in view of the U.S. origin of Trident and its predecessor Polaris.

Why, in 2010, did the U.K. need not only to share highly sensitive nuclear deterrent secrets with the French, but additionally need to build new joint nuclear weapon warhead facilities? Never openly discussed by Westminster, these highly questionable Franco-British plans were simply announced as happening, with no public or political debate as to the need, the security implications or the risks to the independence of the British nuclear weapon stockpile.

Hindsight now affords us the opportunity to join the pieces of the jigsaw, as seen against the other E.U. political moves for E.U. military integration. The step of ‘Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship’ was but a first step towards the integration of the U.K.’s nuclear deterrent into E.U. control, via the stepping- stone of Anglo-French co-operation — a cover for E.U.-driven policy. Max Hofmann of Deutsche Welle revealed something of this on 20 January 2017:

‘Everything must now be put on the table — from higher [E.U.] military spending to a British-French nuclear defense shield for the continent.’

As mentioned earlier, the collision between the French nuclear submarine Le Triomphant and HMS Vanguard is a critical event in analysing Westminster’s undeclared French-U.K. nuclear deterrent integration policy. Submarine safety demands that all submarines co-operating in real and exercise conditions are separated by both depth and or geographical area. Collision is a critical danger to all submarines but carries additional risks in the case of nuclear submarines in respect of nuclear hazards, and exceptional and obvious risks for ballistic missile submarines. Since ballistic missile submarines ‘hide’ in the expanse of the oceans, for HMS Vanguard and Le Triomphant to collide they must have been jointly tasked in immediately adjacent operating areas.

This is highly unusual for nuclear deterrent operations, and the fact that the boats collided strongly suggests that they were placed in very close or even dangerous proximity for unknown joint operations. No proper public reports were ever made of the reason for the joint Franco-British operation or the reasons for the collision. That the collision happened indicates both professional incompetence in the structuring and execution of the joint French-U.K. mission and the severe and proven risks to the operational nuclear deterrent which such a policy represents. It can be no coincidence that just as the U.K. signs up to joint nuclear weapons stewardship with the French, a botched joint nuclear deterrent operation is exposed. The key question remains — at what level was the move to integrate the U.K.’s nuclear and weapons, and it seems also the operational nuclear deterrent, discussed with senior military officers and indeed in Parliament?

  1. common agreement on defence levels, budgetary contribution and policy amongst E.U. member states — this includes an E.U. treasury.

Action taken: These matters have been rising in visibility and intensity over recent months. Alongside calls for greater NATO spending, the E.U. has also called for greater defence contributions by member states. These E.U. monetary calls have also been reinforced by the initial, and significantly now public, calls for the creation of an E.U. treasury. The establishment of an E.U. treasury with E.U. military integration and pan-E.U. military procurement, together with an E.U.-generated foreign and security policy, creates the E.U. superstate, one with total power and control over its individual member states. It is inconceivable that the political mind working from Brussels (and by means of the pro-E.U. politicians in Westminster) to create a full E.U. superstate could allow nuclear weapons, and a strategic nuclear deterrent, to remain in the hands of an independent sovereign state.

  1. establishment of an E.U. command, control and communication structure.

Action taken: Little needs to be said on this subject, as the E.U. has already set up its military command-and-control structure in the U.K. with its HQ at Northwood, supported by St Mawgan and other cells. This fact is evidenced by the testimony of those officers that were originally tasked to set up this E.U. C3 structure. It can be activated within 24 hours. Other E.U. C3 structures (OHQs) exist in Paris, Potsdam and Larissa (Greece), with the C3 in Germany possibly stood up in December 2016.

The Franco-British Council

Further significant clues to the clandestine nature by which Franco-British, nay E.U., military integration has been progressed, come from the activities of the Franco-British Council. Working with the Royal United Services Institute, another unaccountable ‘change agent’, the FBC has held three high-level invitation-only summits to map out the integration of British and French forces. No minutes were produced, and senior members of all three Armed Forces conspired at these meetings behind closed doors, and in civilian dress, to help frame this highly political E.U. military integration agenda.

The 9 March 2010 FBC meeting was clearly timed to pre-empt and direct the Strategic Defence Review, as well as other British domestic policy. As the FBC itself stated:

The purpose of this meeting was twofold, firstly, to extend the FBC British French Defence Initiative of October 2009 … particularly on the basis of [specific] industrial considerations linked to competitive military capabilities … and secondly, ahead of a decisive period in British politics ahead of the General Election in May 2010, and the Strategic Defence Review in the fourth quarter of the same year … it seemed important to resume discussions before the formation of a new government and a reassessment of British strategic priorities.

Hosted by British Ambassador Sir Peter Westmacott at his Paris residence, a more recent meeting on 6 October 2010 continued the theme in the format of a RUSI-organised Franco-British Defence Cooperation Roundtable held behind closed doors, co-chaired by Rt Hon Baroness Taylor, former UK Minister for Defence Equipment; Senator Xavier Pintat of the Defence Committee of the French Senate; and Dr Jonathan Eyal, director of International Security Studies at RUSI. Speakers included Gisela Stuart MP, Contre Amiral Pascal Ausser, Edward Leigh MP, Amiral Alain Coldefy, French MP Françoise Hostalier, Kevin Taylor of BAE Systems, and Vice Admiral Paul Lambert RN.

Just what was Admiral Paul Lambert of the Royal Navy doing in a political meeting, à huis clos, in France, sitting alongside commercial interests, with no minutes taken?

Looking elsewhere, we find that other evidence of collaboration has broken surface. Navy News casually reported that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, had “fought hard for his service, as details of the [recent] Strategic Defence Review were thrashed out.” It was therefore surprising to discover — on the same page — that following the Treaty, Mr Stanhope had been collaborating in a meeting with French naval counterparts to develop joint British-French military doctrine, shared training, equipment and technology, and a common supply chain. It was also accurately reported that Stanhope’s collaboration was conducted wearing civilian lounge suits rather than in uniform.


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Global Power and the History of Trusts

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Soros: Western Society Must Fall Before One World Govt Can Be Established*

War Criminal Blair to Eradicate European Culture to Create a United States of Europe*

Water Supply Cut off in Raqqa City due U.S.-led Coalition Airstrikes*

Water Supply Cut off in Raqqa City due U.S.-led Coalition Airstrikes*

By Manar / Ghossoun

Warplanes of the U.S.-led “international coalition” destroyed the old and new Raqqa bridges and the drinking water lines causing the stopping of pumping water for the entire city of Raqqa.

Local and media sources said that warplanes affiliated to the U.S.-led coalition on Friday morning launched a raid on the new and old Raqqa bridges in Raqqa city, destroying them totally.

The sources added that the airstrikes also targeted the main water line which supplies the city of Raqqa with drinking water which led to cutting off drinking water to the whole city.

In the northern countryside of the province, the sources said that the airstrikes also destroyed the bridges of al-Kalta and al-Abbara completely.


Related Topics:

ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the U.S. Waging War on Syria’s Public Utilities*

Clean Water Returns to Damascus as Syria Reclaims Key Water Source from Terrorists*

U.S.-U.K. Paid White Helmets to Help Block Water to 5 Million Thirsty Syrians*

Water Returns to Syria’s Aleppo after Daesh (ISIS) Stoppage*

Who’s Paying Amnesty Int’l to Lie about Syria?*

Turkey Continues Repeated Violations against the Sanctity and Unity of Syria’s Sovereignty*

Egypt’s U-Turn on Iraq and Syria*

Turkey Continues Repeated Violations against the Sanctity and Unity of Syria’s Sovereignty*

Turkey Continues Repeated Violations against the Sanctity and Unity of Syria’s Sovereignty*

Turkish army tank takes position near Mursitpinar border crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border in the southeasternTurkish town of Suruc in Sanliurfa provincee (Reuters / Kai Pfaffenbach) / Reuters

Turkish army tank takes position near Mursitpinar border crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border in the southeasternTurkish town of Suruc in Sanliurfa provincee (Reuters / Kai Pfaffenbach) / Reuters

By H. Said

Foreign and Expatriates Ministry voiced on Thursday strong condemnation of Turkey’s repeated crimes and attacks against the Syrian people and violations of the sanctity and unity of Syria’s territory.

The condemnation was expressed in two letters addressed to the U.N. Secretary General and President of the Security Council.

The letters referred to the Turkish troops’ incursion into the Syrian territories over the past few days and their occupation of some Syrian villages, including the villages of al-Ghouz and Abu Zibdin west of al-Bab city in northern Aleppo with the aim of advancing towards it.

The letters made it clear that these attacks pose a threat to the international peace and security in the framework of the exposed role played by the Turkish regime in supporting terrorism.

These attacks, the letters added, came in continuation of the Turkish regime’s aggression on Syria for more than five years now, which includes providing various forms of military, material and logistic support to the terrorist organizations, in addition to facilitating the entry of foreign militants into Syria, setting up training camps for them on Turkish soil under direct Turkish intelligence supervision and providing arms and fire cover to the terrorist groups fighting inside Syria.

The Ministry expressed in its letters the Syrian government’s renewed demand that the Security Council assume its responsibilities in preserving international peace and security and putting an end to the violations which the Turkish regime is committing against the Syrian people.


Related Topics:

Russia highly Concerned over Turkey’s Military Intervention in Northern Syria*

Turkey Allows 1,000 Terrorists to Cross Border into Syria’s Idlib*

Corporate Media Silent on M.E. on Israel and Turkey Strike on Syrian Oil Deal*

Turkey Shells Syrian Government Forces*

Washington Planning a Syrian invasion by Turkey and Saudi Arabia to split Syria in half with Washington controlling the Oil Fields*

Egypt’s U-Turn on Iraq and Syria*

Who’s Paying Amnesty Int’l to Lie about Syria?*

Egypt’s U-Turn on Iraq and Syria*

Egypt’s U-Turn on Iraq and Syria*

By Peter Korzun

The Middle East geopolitical scenarios are going through rapid changes with new factors emerging on the regional chessboard.

Cairo’s foreign policy has been given a new twist. It has been announced recently that Egypt is set to receive one million barrels of petroleum per day from Iraq. Saudi Arabia had informed Egypt that shipments of oil products expected under a $23 billion aid deal were been halted indefinitely, suggesting a deepening rift between the countries. From now on, Egypt will enjoy as much oil as it needs at a lower cost, compared to Saudi pricing.

Egyptian President Al-Sisi rejected the Saudi-backed efforts to overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad. He is also reaching out to former-Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh and to his Houthi allies Saudi Arabia is fighting since March 2015. Cairo opened diplomatic channels with the pro-Iranian Lebanese Hezbollah, fighting on the side of President Assad in Syria against the rebel groups supported by Riyadh.

Iraq will provide Egypt with 1 million barrels of Basra light oil each month. The agreement involves extending an oil pipeline from Iraq to Egypt via Jordan. In December, Iraqi petroleum minister Ali al-Luiabi met with the heads of major oil and natural gas companies in Cairo, inviting them to contribute into developing the industry in his country.

Egypt is about to train four Iraqi army units on war against terrorism, in the light of the rapprochement between Egypt and the Iraqi-Iranian axis in the region.

It also mulls sending peacekeeping troops to Syria during the coming days to support the ceasefire agreement under the auspices of Russia, Iran, and Turkey. It has been reported that a unit of Egyptian ground forces might deploy to Syria this month. Last October, Syrian National Security Bureau head Ali Mamlouk visited Cairo to meet Khaled Fawzy, the head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service. The two sides agreed to coordinate political positions and strengthen cooperation in «the fight against terror».

Egypt is a predominantly Sunni nation. Its open support of the Russia-backed coalition in Syria is a game changing event of fundamental importance. It makes the sectarian interpretation of the Syria’s conflict not valid anymore.

Middle East Observer quotes Nziv Net, an Israeli outlet close to intelligence sources, saying that

«Egypt has sent a group of officers to Syria for the first time since the relations have frozen during Morsi’s reign».

Last December, Ibrahim al-Eshaiker al-Jaafari, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, called on Egypt to participate in «a strategic project to fight terrorism», which includes Iran.

In September, Egyptian Foreign Minister Samih Shoukry met for the first time with his Iranian counterpart, Jawad Zarif, during their visits to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly.

In October, Egypt backed a Russian-backed motion in the U.N. calling for a ceasefire in Syria. The move angered Saudi Arabia, which suspended oil shipments to Cairo.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi publicly affirmed his support for the forces of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

The relations between Russia and Egypt have been on the rise. In February 2015, Egypt signed a breakthrough agreement on establishing a free trade zone with the Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.

The progress in military cooperation is tangible. Egypt signed arms deals with Russia worth up to $5 billion by 2015 to include 50 MiG-29M combat aircraft, Buk-M2E and Antey-2500 long range air defense systems and about 50Ka-52K helicopters for Egypt’s new Mistral-class assault ships bought in France. The ships will receive the originally planned Russian helicopters and electronics suite.

The two countries signed several agreements for the renovation of military production factories in Egypt. A protocol is signed to grant Egypt access to GLONASS, the Russian global satellite positioning system. In September, Minister of Defense Sedky Sobhy visited Russia to discuss the issues related to long-term close security relationship. Last October, the militaries held a joint exercise.

Egypt is the most populous country in North Africa and the Arab world, the third-most populous in Africa and the fifteenth-most populous in the world. Last year, the country’s population has just reached 92 million. Its policy shift is well-substantiated. Cairo is fighting the Islamic State on the Sinai Peninsula. The fierce fighting there seldom hits media headlines but the IS poses a grave threat to Egypt. IS militants can also strike Egypt from Libya. The IS presence in Libya brings Egypt and Algeria together as the two great nations face the same threat.

The emerging Iran, Iraq, Russia and Turkey alliance may also include Algeria. In response to the growing menace, Algiers is strengthening ties with Moscow. It has recently purchased 14 Su-30MKA fighters and 40 Mi-28 «Night Hunter» attack helicopters from Russia. Last February, Russia and Algeria laid out a roadmap for deepening bilateral economic and military cooperation during Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Algeria.

Russia’s cooperation with Egypt, Algeria and other countries of the Middle East and North Africa reflects Moscow’s growing clout in the region.

With the Astana process making progress, other large and influential actors, such as Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Algeria, may join the emerging Russia, Iran, Turkey coalition to make the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region face tectonic and dramatic changes.


Related Topics:

Egypt Says No to Saudi, Drafts Generals and Pilots to Fight alongside Syrian Army against ISIS*

When Syria, Palestine and Egypt were there for Europeans in their Time of Need*

Mohamed Morsi Life Sentence Quashed by Egypt Court*

Qaradawi Responds to Violations of al-Sheikh and the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars with al-Azhar, Cairo*

U.S. Withdraws Troops from Sinai, Warns of Coming Egyptian Coup*

Egypt’s Sisi under Fire for Giving Away Red Sea Islands*

Israel Conducted Drone Raids in Egypt’s Sinai*

Saudi Arabia Facing Flack from both Sunni and Shia Leaders*


Who’s Paying Amnesty Int’l to Lie about Syria?*

Who’s Paying Amnesty Int’l to Lie about Syria?*


By Tim Hayward

Most of us living outside Syria know very little of the country or its recent history. What we think we know comes via the media. Information that comes with the endorsement of an organisation like Amnesty International we may tend to assume is reliable. Certainly, I always trusted Amnesty International implicitly, believing I understood and shared its moral commitments.

As a decades-long supporter, I never thought to check the reliability of its reporting. Only on seeing the organisation last year relaying messages from the infamous White Helmets did questions arise for me. Having since discovered a problem about the witness testimonies provided by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), I felt a need to look more closely at Amnesty International’s reporting. Amnesty had been influential in forming public moral judgements about the rights and wrongs of the war in Syria.

What if Amnesty’s reporting on the situation in Syria was based on something other than verified evidence?

What if misleading reports were instrumental in fuelling military conflicts that might otherwise have been more contained, or even avoided?

Amnesty International first alleged war crimes in Syria, against the government of President Bashar Al-Assad, in June 2012. If a war crime involves a breach of the laws of war, and application of those laws presupposes a war, it is relevant to know how long the Syrian government had been at war, assuming it was. The U.N. referred to a ‘situation close to civil war’ in December 2011. Amnesty International’s war crimes in Syria were therefore reported on the basis of evidence that would have been gathered, analysed, written up, checked, approved and published within six months. That is astonishingly – and worryingly – quick.

The report does not detail its research methods, but a press release quotes at length, and exclusively, the words of Donatella Rovera who ‘spent several weeks investigating human rights violations in northern Syria.’ As far as I can tell, the fresh evidence advertised in the report was gathered through conversations and tours Rovera had in those weeks. Her report mentions that Amnesty International ‘had not been able to conduct research on the ground in Syria’.

I am no lawyer, but I find it inconceivable that allegations of war crimes made on this basis would be taken seriously. Rovera herself was later to speak of problems with the investigation in Syria: in a reflective article published two years afterwards, she gives examples of both material evidence and witness statements that had misled the investigation.  Such reservations did not appear on Amnesty’s website; I am not aware of Amnesty having relayed any caveats about the report, nor of its reviewing the war crimes allegations.  What I find of greater concern, though, given that accusations of crimes already committed can in due course be tried, is that Amnesty also did not temper its calls for prospective action.  On the contrary.

In support of its surprisingly quick and decisive stance on intervention, Amnesty International was also accusing the Syrian government of crimes against humanity. Already before Deadly Reprisals, the report Deadly Detention had alleged these. Such allegations can have grave implications because they can be taken as warrant for armed intervention. Whereas war crimes do not occur unless there is a war, crimes against humanity can be considered a justification for going to war. And in war, atrocities can occur that would otherwise not have occurred.

I find this thought deeply troubling, particularly as a supporter of Amnesty International at the time it called for action, the foreseeable consequences of which included fighting and possible war crimes, by whomsoever committed, that might otherwise never have been. Personally, I cannot quite escape the thought that in willing the means to an end one also shares some responsibility for their unintended consequences.

If Amnesty International considered the moral risk of indirect complicity in creating war crimes a lesser one than keeping silent about what it believed it had found in Syria, then it must have had very great confidence in the findings. Was that confidence justified?

If we go back to human rights reports on Syria for the year 2010, before the conflict began, we find Amnesty International recorded a number of cases of wrongful detention and brutality.  In the ten years Bashar Al-Assad had been president, the human rights situation seemed to Western observers not to have improved as markedly as they had hoped. Human Rights Watch spoke of 2000-2010 as a ‘wasted decade’. The consistent tenor of reports was disappointment: advances achieved in some areas had to be set against continued problems in others. We also know that in some rural parts of Syria, there was real frustration at the government’s priorities and policies. An agricultural economy hobbled by the poorly managed effects of severe drought had left the worst off feeling marginalized. Life may have been good for many in vibrant cities, but it was far from idyllic for everyone, and there remained scope to improve the human rights record. The government’s robust approach to groups seeking an end to the secular state of Syria was widely understood to need monitoring for reported excesses. Still, the pre-war findings of monitors, are a long way from any suggestion of crimes against humanity. That includes the findings of Amnesty International Report 2011: the state of the world’s human rights.

A report published just three months later portrays a dramatically different situation. In the period from April to August 2011, events on the ground had certainly moved quickly in the wake of anti-government protests in parts of the country, but so had Amnesty.

In promoting the new report, Deadly Detention, Amnesty International USA notes with pride how the organisation is now providing ‘real-time documentation of human rights abuses committed by government forces’. Not only is it providing rapid reporting, it is also making strong claims. Instead of measured statements suggesting necessary reforms, it now condemns Assad’s government for ‘a widespread, as well as systematic, attack against the civilian population, carried out in an organized manner and pursuant to a state policy to commit such an attack.’ The Syrian government is accused of ‘crimes against humanity’.

The speed and confidence – as well as the implied depth of insight – of the report are remarkable. The report is worrying, too, given how portentous is its damning finding against the government: Amnesty International ‘called on the U.N. Security Council to not only condemn, in a firm and legally binding manner, the mass human rights violations being committed in Syria but also to take other measures to hold those responsible to account, including by referring the situation in Syria to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. As well, Amnesty International continues to urge the Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Syria and to immediately freeze the assets of President al-Assad and other officials suspected of responsibility for crimes against humanity.’ With such strongly-worded statements as this, especially in a context where powerful foreign states are already calling for ‘regime change’ in Syria, Amnesty’s contribution could be seen as throwing fuel on a fire.

Since it is not just the strength of the condemnation that is noteworthy, but the swiftness of its delivery – in ‘real-time’ – a question that Amnesty International supporters might consider is how the organisation can provide instantaneous coverage of events while also fully investigating and verifying the evidence.

Amnesty International’s reputation rests on the quality of its research. The organisation’s Secretary General, Salil Shetty, has clearly stated the principles and methods adhered to when gathering evidence:

we do it in a very systematic, primary, way where we collect evidence with our own staff on the ground. And every aspect of our data collection is based on corroboration and cross-checking from all parties, even if there are, you know, many parties in any situation because of all of the issues we deal with are quite contested. So it’s very important to get different points of view and constantly cross check and verify the facts.’

Amnesty thus sets itself rigorous standards of research, and assures the public that it is scrupulous in adhering to them. This is only to be expected, I think, especially when grave charges are to be levelled against a government.

Did Amnesty follow its own research protocol in preparing the Deadly Detention report? Was it: systematic, primary, collected by Amnesty’s own staff, on the ground, with every aspect of data collection verified by corroboration and by cross-checking with all parties concerned?

In the analysis appended here as a note I show, point by point, that the report admits failing to fulfil some of these criteria and fails to show it has met any of them.

Given that the findings could be used to support calls for humanitarian intervention in Syria, the least to expect of the organization would be application of its own prescribed standards of proof.

Lest it be thought that focusing on the technicalities of research methodology risks letting the government off the hook for egregious crimes, it really needs to be stressed – as was originally axiomatic for Amnesty International – that we should never make a presumption of guilt without evidence or trial. Quite aside from technical questions, getting it wrong about who is the perpetrator of war crimes could lead to the all too real consequences of mistakenly intervening on the side of the actual perpetrators.

Suppose it nevertheless be insisted that the evidence clearly enough shows Assad to be presiding over mass destruction of his own country and slaughter in his own people: surely the ‘international community’ should intervene on the people’s behalf against this alleged ‘mass murderer’? In the climate of opinion and with the state of knowledge abroad at the time, that may have sounded a plausible proposition. It was not the only plausible proposition, however, and certainly not in Syria itself. Another was that the best sort of support to offer the people of Syria would lie in pressing the government more firmly towards reforms while assisting it, as was becoming increasingly necessary, in ridding the territory of terrorist insurgents who had fomented and then exploited the tensions in the original protests of Spring 2011. For even supposing the government’s agents of internal security needed greater restraint, the best way to achieve this is not necessarily to undermine the very government that would be uniquely well-placed, with support and constructive incentives, to apply it.

I do not find it obvious that Amnesty was either obliged or competent to decide between these alternative hypotheses. Since it nevertheless chose to do so, we have to ask why it pre-emptively dismissed the method of deciding proposed by President Al-Assad himself. This was his undertaking to hold an election to ask the people whether they wanted him to stay or go.

Although not widely reported in the West, and virtually ignored by Amnesty – a presidential election was held in 2014, with the result being a landslide victory for Bashar Al-Assad. He won 10,319,723 votes – 88.7% of the vote – with a turnout put at 73.42%.

Western observers did not challenge those numbers or allege voting irregularities, with the media instead seeking to downplay their significance. ‘This is not an election that can be analysed in the same way as a multi-party, multi-candidate election in one of the established European democracies or in the U.S., says the BBC’s Jeremy Bowen in Damascus. It was an act of homage to President Assad by his supporters, which was boycotted and rejected by opponents rather than an act of politics, he adds.’ This homage, nonetheless, was paid by an outright majority of Syrians. To refer to this as ‘meaningless’, as U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry did, reveals something of how much his own regime respected the people of Syria. It is true that voting could not take place in opposition-held areas, but participation overall was so great that even assuming the whole population in those areas would have voted against him, they would still have had to accept Assad as legitimate winner – rather as we in Scotland have to accept Theresa May as U.K. prime minister. In fact, the recent liberation of eastern Aleppo has revealed Assad’s government actually to have support there.

We cannot know if Assad would have been so many people’s first choice under other circumstances, but we can reasonably infer that the people of Syria saw in his leadership their best hope for unifying the country around the goal of ending the bloodshed. Whatever some might more ideally have sought – including as expressed in the authentic protests of 2011 – the will of the Syrian people quite clearly was, under the actual circumstances, for their government to be allowed to deal with their problems, rather than be supplanted by foreign-sponsored agencies.

(I am tempted to add the thought, as a political philosopher, that BBC’s Jeremy Bowen could be right in saying the election was no normal ‘act of politics’: Bashar Al-Assad has always been clear in statements and interviews that his position is inextricably bound up with the Syrian constitution.  He didn’t choose to give up a career in medicine to become a dictator, as I understand it; rather, the chance event of his older brother’s death altered his plans. Until actual evidence suggests otherwise, I am personally prepared to believe that Assad’s otherwise incomprehensible steadfastness of purpose does indeed stem from a commitment to defending his country’s constitution. Whether or not the people really wanted this person as president is secondary to the main question whether they were prepared to give up their national constitution to the dictates of anybody other than that of the Syrian people. Their answer to this has a significance, as Bowen inadvertently notes, that is beyond mere politics.)

Since the Syrian people had refuted the proposition that Amnesty had been promoting, serious questions have be asked. Among these, one – which would speak to a defence of Amnesty – is whether it had some independent justification – coming from sources of information other than its own investigations – for genuinely believing its allegations against the Syrian government well-founded. However, since an affirmative answer to that question would not refute the point I have sought to clarify here I shall set them aside for a separate discussion in the next episode of this investigation.

My point for now is that Amnesty International itself had not independently justified its own advocacy position. This is a concern for anyone who thinks it should take full responsibility for the monitoring it reports. Further discussion has also to address concerns about what kinds of advocacy it should be engaged in at all.


Related Topics:

Amnesty International in Spirit No Longer Exists*

“Dirty Players in Geopolitics”: Letter to “Doctors Without Borders” (MSF)*

A Flemish Priest in Syria, “Putin and Assad saved my life”*

Clean Water Returns to Damascus as Syria Reclaims Key Water Source from Terrorists*

U.S. Coalition Airstrikes Killed More Civilians in Syria*

ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the U.S. Waging War on Syria’s Public Utilities*

Pentagon Re-Packages Al-Qaeda as ‘Khorasan Group’ to Sell Attack on Syria*

U.S.-U.K. Paid “White Helmets” Help to Block Water to 5 Million Thirsty Syrians*

Nationwide Truce Reached Between Syria Army, Opposition Groups*

Syrian Elections 2016: US, NATO Criminals Failed Attempt to Deny the Will of the Syrian People*

Israel Bombs Syrian Military Airport near Assad’s Presidential Palace*

U.S. Intensifies Operations in Syria and Iraq amidst Syrian Truce*

U.S. Moves to Arm Terrorists in Syria with Anti-Aircraft Weapons*

British Generals Arrive in Syria to Recruit Aleppo Terrorists*

14+ U.S. Coalition Military Officers Captured by Syrian Special Forces in East Aleppo Bunker*

$17k per Month for Journalists Could Have Spent on the NHS was used for Fake News on Syria*